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John Mueller’s recent argument about the banality of “ethnic war” contains a curious
glitch.1 Mueller would lead us to believe that the large-scale killings in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia during the 1990s “could happen just about anywhere” (p. 67), with-
out acknowledging that what took place in both countries has occurred repeatedly in
each. By failing to adequately consider past events, he then cannot satisfactorily explain
why those he labels “thugs” preferentially target only certain categories of fellow
citizens, or how interethnic violence can lead to what he is so anxious to dismiss—
namely, ethnic war.
This omission is unfortunate because Mueller is correct in his general observation:
“Small groups of armed thugs” do play a catalytic role in intrastate violence.2 Also, he
is astute to lump together Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, because in neither place
did the state per se fail (though it did neglect to protect members of particular groups).
Violence did not spread to the center from the peripheries, as it did in Somalia and
Sierra Leone, two other countries torn asunder by ethnic conºict in the 1990s.3 Nor was
it the goal of disaffected citizens to capture (or destroy) the seat of government. Rather,
as Mueller points out, the governments helped direct Hutu and Serb perpetrators to pil-
lage, rape, and murder, but always with an unmistakably ethnic bias.
As Mueller himself points out, the thugs could have gone after left-handers or right-
handers, or people of a different class or ideological allegiance. But they did not. In-
stead they were directed to selectively terrorize the populace. In Mueller’s view, they
were unleashed and allowed to wreak havoc on those who “were on the wrong side of
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the political fence” (p. 60). But although the Interahamwe’s hatchet men did kill moder-
ates of all stripes in Rwanda, all Tutsis were considered fair game. Nor was this the ªrst
time that Tutsis had been collectively targeted simply for being Tutsi. Modern Rwanda
has known a succession of ethnic massacres, beginning in 1959, spiking in 1963–64, and
resuming in 1990.4 So has neighboring Burundi: in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1989, and 1993.5 In
fact, the timing of events in Rwanda cannot be adequately understood without taking
into account the ebb and ºow of interethnic relations throughout East-Central Africa.
Refugee ºows from Tutsi-ruled Burundi have always heightened tensions in Rwanda.6
But even domestic Ugandan politics ªgured into the 1994 genocide, as the formerly
Uganda-based Rwanda Patriotic Front (considered a predominantly Tutsi army)
launched a series of offensives against President Juvénal Habyarimana’s forces in 1991,
and then again in February 1994.7
Mueller ignores these and other historical and regional complexities. He may have to
in order to knock down his straw man, which is the notion that ethnic war is a war of
“all against all and neighbor against neighbor” (p. 42). It seems that for Mueller, ethnic
conºict has to be grounded in mass hate; so long as “the vast majority” (p. 43) do not
take up arms, the conºict cannot be considered ethnically motivated—never mind that
most genocides have been perpetrated by a relative few supported by a willfully ne-
glectful many,8 or that those who use thugs may have a cunning rationale because any
undisciplined, armed gang is likely to generate fear.
Fear, not hatred, is the prime motivator in ethnic conºicts.9 People normally fear con-
tamination, competition, and crime. Propaganda (like terrorism) feeds on this fear, and
did so in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Whenever citizens feel threatened by
too much insecurity, they seek protection from the state. Should the state fail them, be-
cause ofªcials are either inept or corrupt, individuals then take matters into their own
hands. We see this even in the United States in benighted neighborhoods, where heads
of households install security systems, purchase guard dogs, and own guns. However,
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the signals sent (and received) when members of only certain groups are being consis-
tently and systematically singled out for persecution or neglect puts the lie to equal op-
portunity lawlessness. When perpetrators selectively target the descendants of those
who drew their parents’ or grandparents’ blood, history is evoked. Likewise, for citi-
zens who routinely read the social landscape through ethnic (religious, linguistic, or re-
gional) lenses and parse all political announcements for hidden meanings, “criminals
and sadists” do not merely “debase the conditions of life” (p. 67). They also tweak la-
tent phobias, reinvigorate paranoia, shatter faith in the state, and wreck the future.
The twist that Mueller misses is the extent to which thugs in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia made history count and ethnicity matter. As he points out, Slobodan
Milosevib could not rely on Serb soldiers, many of whom were members of the former
Yugoslav army, to do his bidding. Mueller views their recalcitrance as proof that most
Serbs were not out to cleanse non-Serbs. But there could be another reason so many
Serbs in uniform refused to engage in domestic terrorism. The army was Yugoslavia’s
most nationalist institution.10 There is every indication that signiªcant numbers of sol-
diers viewed themselves not as Serbs ªrst (at least not initially), but as Yugoslavs; their
loyalties were to a Yugoslav and not a Serb or Croat nation.11 Ergo the need for thugs.
Deploying an untrained, and untrainable, rabble offers leaders two advantages. Hoo-
ligans do not bother to distinguish between (unarmed) civilians and (unarmed)
noncivilians. And they engage in crude behavior. The terror they spread is a fear multi-
plier. Beheadings, mutilations, immolations, and other gruesome acts may incite uni-
versal horror, but they also call to mind previous episodes of barbarism.12 People
automatically make the link between who did what to whom in the past and who is do-
ing what to whom in the present; the extent to which history is being repeated is duly
noted, and itself becomes a factor in convincing people that nothing is random. Also, in
places where people have only one another to rely on—in rural areas and villages (and
in dysfunctional states)—knowing whom to trust or not to trust is of vital importance.
Betrayals have long been catalogued. And because neighbors make their history in
common, mutual suspicions are continually being stoked.13
Mistrust does not mean that neighbors necessarily hate one another, or that they are
itching to right past wrongs and seek revenge. According to Mueller, once most ordi-
nary Hutus and Serbs realized that crimes were being committed in their collective
names, their overwhelming response was bewilderment and paralysis. These are not,
he notes, the hallmarks of hate. But they could denote fear of future retribution or the
wearisome realization that the cycle of violence is revving up again. Alternatively, they
might reºect people’s sheer indifference. After all, just knowing that the violence is not
random may be the only thing that most people care about, especially when the state
signals that it will still protect you.
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Mueller’s ahistoricism prevents him from probing very far beneath the surface of re-
cent events. Worse, there is a practical danger associated with his argument. Although
his article makes a compelling case for paying more careful attention to state sponsor-
ship of thugs as harbingers of violence yet to come, his proffered solution—intervention
by an outside police force—is no kind of ªx. Not only does the temporary restoration of
security by an outside police force do nothing to change people’s memories or alter
their reasons for mutual mistrust, but police can do nothing to reverse or alleviate de-
mographic imbalances. The fact that in many countries there are simply too many frus-
trated (unemployed, underemployed, semi-educated, or barely skilled) males presents
huge challenges.14 So too does the existence of deep local knowledge, which people
plumb to make sense of the world around them.
In the end, it may be how—and not what—we think that mires certain groups again
and again in conºict. As humans, none of us may be able to help ourselves from alter-
nately dreaming about and fearing the future, or reaching backward and using history
as a guide. The key is to purge the viciousness from that cycle, a task that requires
something more pervasive and permanent than ºeeting interventions.
—Anna Simons
Monterey, California
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The Author Replies:
I would like to make four comments in response to Anna Simons’s thoughtful critique.
First, I do not think that the notions that ethnic wars emerge out of primordial or politi-
cian-stoked hatreds and that these wars are essentially deep-seated conºicts of all
against all or neighbor against neighbor are straw man arguments. That perspective is
easily the most prominent one among journalistic accounts of the wars in the former
Yugoslavia, and it is substantially embraced in many academic assessments.1 In addi-
tion, it is overwhelmingly the image projected in discussions of the genocide in
Rwanda.2 More broadly, it is a conception that Thomas Hobbes developed for the reli-
gious civil wars of his period, a perspective that has, to say the least, generated a sub-
14. See Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story”; Bazenguissa-Ganga, “The Spread of Political Vio-
lence in Congo-Brazzaville”; Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy; and El-Kenz, “Youth and Violence.” As if
the present is not bad enough, Lionel Tiger alludes to an even grimmer future in The Decline of
Males (New York: Golden Books, 1999).
1. The image clearly retains its journalistic appeal. David Rohde, a reporter highly experienced in
the area, found that although some Albanians claimed that their Serb neighbors aided or joined the
marauders during the Serb rampages in Kosovo in 1999, he could ªnd no Albanians who were ac-
tually able to name a local Serb who had been involved. He also reports that local Serbs
animatedly insisted that masked paramilitaries were to blame. Despite this, his article was given
the headline, “Where Neighbors Attacked Neighbors, Justice Is Far from Easy,” by his New York
Times editors, June 23, 1999, p. A10.
2. For a rare but important exception, see René Lemarchand, “U.S. Policy in the Great Lakes: A









stantial literature and one that is often applied to ethnic war. Moreover, many analysts
have documented the massive defections that took place in the Serbian army (hardly
the bastion of cosmopolitanism that Simons contends) and the widespread draft dodg-
ing that occurred in Serbia itself, and it seems to me important to extrapolate from those
facts to question the notion that Serbs and other Balkan peoples were seething with ex-
plosive hatreds.3
Second, I substantially agree with Simons’s perspective on much of the mechanics
of violence in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. As she points out, “Any undisciplined,
armed gang is likely to generate fear,” and it is precisely my point that this was the
key dynamic in the thug-dominated wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. She is correct
to note in addition that the thugs did not commit their depredations in a random man-
ner (at least initially), but were sent into action with nationalism as an “ordering
device” (in my terminology) or as a “cunning rationale” (in her nice characterization).
And I certainly agree that it was the fear stirred up by these marauding gangs—not
elemental, ancient, or newly stoked hatreds—that best explains what happened in these
cases.
Third, my conclusion therefore is that such disasters could potentially (though not
necessarily easily) occur almost anywhere. This is because deep hatred—ethnic or oth-
erwise—is not required. What is required is the breakdown of police order and the mo-
bilization by politicians with their own agenda of small numbers of murderous and
opportunistic thugs—something that all nations have in ready supply. By contrast,
Simons seems to want to conclude that such developments could happen only in places
where massacres have occurred “repeatedly” or “again and again.” She is, of course,
correct to note that there have been several massacres of Hutus by Tutsis and Tutsis by
Hutus over the last four decades (though there was little violence between them before
1959), but this is simply not true for Yugoslavia. Indeed, except during World War II,
3. Simons contends (and I substantially agree) that “most genocides have been perpetuated by a
relative few supported by a willfully neglectful many.” Curiously, however, she approvingly cites
a book pointedly entitled Mass Hate, in which the author argues that the depredations in places
such as Bosnia and Rwanda were “situations where large portions of nations or cultural groups
have participated in mass murder, acts of terror, or other atrocities against unarmed civilians se-
lected primarily because of their race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, or ideology.” Neil J. Kressel,
Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror (New York: Plenum, 1996), p. 2 (emphasis added).
Simons also cites the work of Daniel Goldhagen. Although Goldhagen does not see Germany’s Fi-
nal Solution as a neighbor-against-neighbor process, he—like Robert Kaplan on Yugoslavia—does
argue that Nazi efforts to exterminate the Jewish population stemmed from explosive mass hatred:
There had long been, Goldhagen argues, a “pre-existing, pent-up antisemitism” in Germany that
Hitler and the Nazis merely needed to “unshackle and thereby activate.” Goldhagen, Hitler’s Will-
ing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 443. For
an excellent and broad-ranging analysis of the proposition that mass killings are perpetuated by
the few rather than by the many, see Benjamin Valentino, “Final Solutions: The Causes of Genocide
and Mass Killing,” Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring 2000), pp. 1–62; and, more extensively,
Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). See also
John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’: Yugoslavia and Rwanda,” paper presented at the an-
nual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 31–Septem-
ber 3, 2000, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/apsa2000.pdf.
International Security 25:4 192
the episodes of violence between Serbs and Croats have been few.4 In fact, if intermar-
riage rates are indicative, Serbs and Croats got along considerably better than whites
and blacks do in the United States.
There was little systematic violence against Jews in Germany before Adolf Hitler. The
suggestion that ethnic killing can emerge only where it has before would have led one,
using Simons’s logic, to expect it in the countries to Germany’s east.
Fourth, I argue that thug-dominated conºicts, like those in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, can be policed relatively easily (though not necessarily costlessly) by an
organized, disciplined, and sizable army. Such an army could halt the violence because
opportunistic bullies are unlikely to put up much of a ªght. I do not contend, however,
that this process can suddenly cause people to alter their memories, restore mutual
trust, or purge all viciousness. But I do think that stopping people from killing one
other is a notable, even admirable, achievement. To get them to love each other is, as
Simons rightly suggests, a larger task, and one for which armies are not well suited. The
peace they provide, however, does furnish an opportunity, though no guarantee, for
deeper, longer-range healing from the ravages of war.
—John Mueller
Columbus, Ohio
4. Noel Malcolm, “Seeing Ghosts,” National Interest, No. 32 (Summer 1993), pp. 83–88.
